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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Diﬀerent aspects aﬀect taxpayers￿ willingness to evade: attitudes towards tax compliance
are in￿uenced by opportunities to evade and personal circumstances that may impact
on the cost of compliance, by people￿s perceptions of how they are treated by the tax
authority1 and their perceptions of the enforcement system, and also by interactions with
other taxpayers. An important decision that the tax authority has to make is how to
allocate investigation resources among diﬀerent groups of taxpayers. For this it is crucial
for the tax authority to know how taxpayers are aﬀected by audits.
Recent empirical studies have attempted to estimate the impact of audits on tax
compliance. These studies, mostly based on US data, distinguish between the direct and
indirect eﬀects of investigations. The direct eﬀect is described as the additional revenues
in the form of unpaid taxes and ￿nes collected by the tax authority through investigations.
The indirect eﬀect relates instead to the behavioural response of taxpayers to a change
in the audit policy and measures the increase in tax compliance induced in the whole
community of taxpayers, not only within those taxpayers being investigated.
The reported estimates on the eﬀects of audits on compliance are quite diﬀerent,
but diﬃcult to compare, as these studies use diﬀerent data sets. When estimates for
the direct and indirect eﬀects are provided, a common result is that indirect eﬀect tend
to be much higher than the direct eﬀect. A clear understanding of the direction and
magnitude of these eﬀects is crucial to inform the decision of the tax authority on how to
optimally allocate investigation resources among diﬀerent groups of taxpayers. However,
the methodology used in the empirical studies to calculate the indirect and direct eﬀects
does not allow to distinguish the determinants of these eﬀects and hence very little can
be said on how these eﬀects vary across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers.
In this paper we formalise the concepts of direct and indirect eﬀects of investigations,
which seem to have been neglected by the theoretical literature. The theoretical models
on tax evasion have analysed the overall impact of investigations without distinguishing
between direct and indirect eﬀects. In the standard portfolio models2 the tax authority
sets the probability of detection, the tax rate and the ￿ne rate independently from the
taxpayer￿s decision. There is no interaction between the tax authority and the represen-
tative taxpayer and the tax parameters are ￿xed, chosen independently from taxpayers￿
behaviour. Later contributions have analysed, by use of game theoretical models, the
interaction between taxpayers and the tax authority. The assumption made in those
models is that the choice of the tax parameters depends on the extent of evasion, in that
1Kristina Murphy (2003) shows that the way taxpayers feel treated and whether they feel they are
trusted by the tax authority is crucial in determining taxpayers￿ behaviour.
2Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974).
1taxpayers￿ decisions have an impact on the tax revenues raised by the Government3.H o w -
ever these models consider the overall response of taxpayers to the audit policy, without
distinguishing between direct and indirect eﬀects.
In a very general model, we derive the rule for the optimal allocation of resources
across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers and identify the diﬀerent elements that determine the
direct and indirect eﬀects of investigations. We then derive a formula for the ratio between
indirect and direct eﬀects. If the ratio were constant across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers,
there wouldn￿t be any need to know the values of the diﬀerent components. However, we
show that there is no reason to assume the ratio to be constant across diﬀerent groups of
taxpayers. The ratio depends on how intensively a given group of taxpayers is audited, on
the eﬀectiveness of investigations and on the behavioural elasticity of taxpayers. The ￿rst
two factors do indeed vary across taxpayers. For the elasticity of evasion this is not clear.
However, even if the elasticity of evasion were equal across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers
the ratio between indirect and direct eﬀects would still vary across diﬀerent groups of
taxpayers and ￿scalities. Hence measuring the single components of the ratio is very
important for identifying the optimal allocation of investigation resources. In the empirical
studies we brie￿y review the estimates for the elasticities are quite diﬀerent and it is
not clear what is the underlying assumption on the motivations driving tax compliance.
The diﬀerence in the signi￿cance and magnitude of the behavioural response to audits
emerging from these studies may be due to the diﬀerent aspects of individual behaviour
that may be captured by the diﬀerent datasets. In particular, individual behaviour might
not only be aﬀected by purely individualistic calculus but might also re￿ect some sort of
group norms, i.e. the compliance decision of an individual may depend on the proportion
of taxpayers within their reference group who are honest. If this is the case individual
level data will not capture this link and hence the deterrent eﬀect of investigations might
be underestimated. With this in mind we compare three diﬀerent settings: one where
taxpayers are purely motivated by sel￿sh attitudes, one where they also attach a moral
dimension to tax compliance and a third context where tax compliance is a social norm
and analyse the impact of a rise in the audit rate on aggregate voluntary compliance. We
show that if tax compliance is a social norm in the relevant community, the importance
attached to the social norm aﬀects overall voluntary compliance as well as the response to
an increase in the audit probability. In particular, the more people care about the social
norm the greater the reduction in total evasion for a given increase in the audit rate.
This implies that the greater the importance attached to the social norm, the greater the
elasticity of evasion calculated at the community level.
3See Reinganum and Wilde (1984),(1991), Graetz et al. (1986) and Cremer et al. (1990), Greenberg
(1984).
2In the following section we discuss the available empirical evidence on the eﬀects of
investigations on tax compliance. In section 3 we derive a formalisation of the concepts
of direct and indirect eﬀect and separate out the diﬀerent elements characterising the
two concepts. In section 4 we consider three possible ways taxpayers may be motivated
whether or not to comply and show the impact of a rise in the audit rate on aggregate
evasion. Section 5 presents some simulations on how the optimal allocation of investigation
resources varies within two groups of taxpayers who have diﬀerent evasion elasticities and
for diﬀerent budgets of the enforcement agency. Finally section 6 concludes.
2 Evidence on the eﬀects of investigations.
The empirical evidence on the impact of audit rates on taxpayers￿ compliance is quite
recent and rather thin. These studies analyse the eﬀects of audits on reported income
and tax liabilities. A distinction is made between the direct and indirect eﬀects of inves-
tigations and the behavioural response of taxpayers is measured in terms of the elasticity
of reported income and reported tax to the audit rate. Estimates of these elasticities are
quite diﬀerent as the estimates of the ratio between indirect and direct eﬀects. We present
the results of six studies, two of which are based on individual level data.
Beron et al.(1992) analyse the eﬀects of audits and socioeconomic variables on com-
pliance. The authors distinguish two compliance decisions: income reports and reports of
subtractions on the tax return. This for two main reasons. First the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice assumes that the probability of detection is much higher for subtractions than income
reports. Secondly the behaviour of taxpayers may diﬀer for these two types of compliance
activities. In particular the authors believe that non-compliance from underreports is
often an act of omission, whereas non-compliance from overstatement of subtractions re-
quires actual misstatements. They use US data from individual tax returns for 1969 ￿led
in 1970. These include reported Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), reported total tax liability
and number of returns ￿led. The information on audit is from a diﬀerent database (the
IRS￿s Project 778) and relates to audits performed in 1969. Socio-economic variables are
measures of income and tastes and preferences from the 1970 Census of Population and
Housing. All data are aggregated to the three-digit zip code to match the data available
on audits.
Each equation is estimated for ￿ve diﬀerent audit classes (low-income tax returns
taking the standard deductions, low-income tax returns taking itemised deductions, low-
income proprietor tax returns, middle income wage and salary workers and middle income
proprietor tax returns).
Results suggest that increasing the odds of an audit signi￿cantly increases reported
3AGI for two groups ( low-income tax returns taking the standard deduction and low-
income proprietor tax returns) and tax liabilities for three groups (low-income tax returns
taking the standard deduction, low-income proprietor tax returns and middle income
proprietor tax returns). The magnitudes of the eﬀects of audits on tax compliance are in
general modest and the elasticities for reported AGI are smaller than the elastiticies for
reported tax liability for all ￿ve audit classes4. The authors do not calculate the direct
and indirect eﬀects of investigations.
Another study based on individual level data is by Erard (1992). The author describes
the indirect eﬀects of investigations as the additional future tax revenues that arise from an
increase in the audit rate due to improved compliance by two diﬀerent groups of taxpayers:
those who have been audited and respond to the examination experience by improving
their compliance behaviour and those who are not audited but nevertheless perceive a
greater threat of examinations. In order to estimate the magnitude to these two sources
of indirect revenue gains, Erard focuses on the eﬀects of tax audits on subsequent years
reporting behaviour. The author uses two US data sources from IRS on taxpayers who
were the targets of an audit in one year and, purely by chance, were subject of a second
audit two years later. The ￿rst data source is the 1982 IRS TCMP Survey, which contains
results of thorough, line-by-line, audits of a large strati￿ed random sample of 1982 federal
income tax returns and information about the prior year return characteristics of all
taxpayers in the TCMP sample, including whether their previous two tax returns were
audited. The second data source is the 1985 TCMP Survey. Information on the prior
audit history of taxpayers was obtained through a social security number match with
I R Sr e c o r d so na u d i t so f1983 and 1984 tax returns. This second data source contains
complete information on prior audit assessments as well as the disposition of prior audit
cases. Two approaches are used to examine the in￿uence of a tax audit on subsequent
year reporting. The author ￿rst examines if those taxpayers who experienced a large audit
assessment improve their compliance in a subsequent year, but ￿nds inconclusive results.
In the second approach the author investigates whether those taxpayers who experienced
a prior audit diﬀer in their subsequent year reporting behaviour from taxpayers who
did not experience a prior audit, after controlling for taxpayers characteristics and the
prior year audit selection process. The estimates obtained from the regressions are not
statistically signi￿cant and the author shows that the ￿ndings are highly sensitive to the
assumptions and speci￿cations imposed. One problem pointed out by the author is a
sample selection bias: unobserved factors in￿uencing prior year audits may be correlated
with the unobserved factors in￿uencing subsequent year tax non-compliance. Although
the hypothesis of sample selection bias seems to be rejected by the data, if the assumption
4These latter vary between 0.19a n d0 . 3 1 when signi￿cant.
4of sample selection bias is imposed and the model is re-estimated, the coeﬃcients of the
prior audit become signi￿cant.
We would like to remark that the underlying assumption of Erard is that taxpayers
know about the audit rule of the tax authority and even if they are not audited they are
able to perceive the change in the audit rate. In reality taxpayers may assume that audits
are carried out at random and believe that getting an audit in the current period does
not mean getting another one in the future. Hence they might not change their behaviour
after being investigated or perceiving a higher threats of audit.
Tauchen et al.(1989) analyse the eﬀects of audits and of the tax code on reported
income. They use individual level data from the 1979 Tax Compliance Measurement
Program and combine them with IRS administrative records for District Oﬃces and 1980
Census data at the ￿ve-digit Zip code level. Audit data are only at IRS District level5.A l l
data are aggregated at district level to match with the audit data. The authors estimate
a reported income equation for four audit classes that diﬀer by their total positive income
and have non business source: low income (below $10,000) , middle income (between
$10,000 and $25,000), middle income (between $25,000 and $50,000) and high income
(above $50,000). Their ￿ndings suggest that audits stimulate higher income reports for
all four groups but the eﬀect is statistically signi￿cant only for the highest income group.
According to the authors￿ calculations, the indirect yield from increasing the audit rate
for high income wage and salary workers by one percentage point (from the 1979 level of
10.4 to 11.4), would be three times the direct revenue. However, there is no derivation of
this result. The authors report an elasticity of declared income with respect to the audit
rate equal to 0.19.
Dubin et al.(1990) investigate the overall role of audits in the federal revenue collection
process using state level data for the period 1977-1986, when there was a sharp decline
in the audit rate. In particualr the authors aim at estimating the spillover eﬀects of
investigations, which they de￿ne as the ￿...increase in collections from taxpayers, whether
or not they are audited, who report more taxes due in response to an increase in the
likelyhood of an audit￿. The authors estimate two models. One speci￿es reported taxes
per return ￿led as a function of audit rates and a variety of socio-economic factors. The
other model speci￿es returns ￿led per capita as a function of the same variables. Data
on audits consist of the total individual income tax returns examined divided by total
individual income tax returns ￿led. In order to calculate the spillover eﬀects they repeat
5The IRS Districts are administrative units responsible for conducting audits. The boundaries of the
districts coincide more or less with the states, except in the most populous states, where multiple districts
are established. Until 1984 Califormia, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas all had two districts and
New York had four. In 1984 another district was added to Texas and three were added to California.
5the analysis using reported tax plus additional tax and penalty recommended after an
audit per return as a dependent variable in the ￿rst model. They use the following
procedure. From the results obtained from their regressions, they use the estimated
reported tax liability per return and total returns ￿led per capita to calculate, for each
year, the predicted value of total reported tax from individual returns that would have
been realised if the audit rate had remained constant at its 1977 level over the period
1977-1986.
They estimate that maintaining the audit rate at its 1977 value, by 1986 total reported
tax would have increased by 15.6 billion dollars, which is 4% of total individual tax in
1986. This value is the indirect eﬀect or spillover eﬀect of investigations. In order to get
the direct eﬀect of investigations they add additional taxes and penalties resulting from
investigations to reported tax, for each state in each year, and divide by the number of
returns ￿led. This generates a dependent variable which includes the revenue produced
by audits. They call this variable assessed liability per return. Repeating the same
calculation as for total reported tax, they obtain a predicted value for the increase in
total assessed liability for 1986 from holding the audit rate to its 1977 value of 18.2 billion
dollars. The diﬀerence between this ￿gure and the predicted value of total reported tax
(15.6 billion dollars) gives a direct revenue eﬀect of 2.6 billion. Hence the ratio between
indirect and direct eﬀect is 6:1, i.e. the indirect eﬀects of audits produce six out of every
seven dollars of additional revenue.
More recently Plumley (1996) presents an econometric analysis on the determinants
of voluntary compliance, using a very rich dataset by state and year, from 1982 through
1991, including data on taxpayer behaviour and IRS actions. As measures of voluntary
compliance Plumley adopts the ratio between how many returns were ￿led over the re-
turns required to be ￿led and how much income and oﬀsets were reported over income
required to be reported and oﬀsets allowed to be claimed. The explanatory variables
w e r eg r o u p e di nd i ﬀerent sets: tax policy measures ( e.g. ￿ling threshold, allowed exemp-
tions), burden/opportunity variables (e.g. hours needed to complete a tax return, type of
income), IRS enforcement measures (audit rate at the start of the period, information re-
turn matching program, non-￿ler notices, refund oﬀsets and criminal tax convictions), IRS
responsiveness (telephone assistance, return preparation services) and other demographic
and economic factors.
The ￿ndings suggest that audits have a signi￿cant compliance eﬀect and the indirect
eﬀects of an audit outweigh the direct eﬀect. Plumley obtains an estimate for the ratio
between indirect eﬀects and direct eﬀects in a similar way than Dubin et al. and gets a
value of 11:1.
It is worth noting that the author criticises models using micro-level data, e.g. 3 digit
6and 5 digit ZIP code level data, to estimate the general deterrent eﬀects of investigations.
According to the author, models that use 3-digit and 5-digit level data, ￿...implicitly
assume that the general deterrent eﬀect operates only within the strict con￿nes of each
unit of observation (e.g. a ZIP code boundary), and it seems obvious that people will
develop their compliance perceptions and propensities based on the information they get
from a wide variety of sources from many locations6.￿
The only UK study is by Mayston and Martin (1998), on the deterrent eﬀects of
VAT assurance visits on VAT non compliance. The authors use cross section data for
48,000 traders across the UK for the year 1996. They distinguish three types of eﬀects
of investigations: the deterrent eﬀect, the total direct net additional liability eﬀect and
the preventive eﬀect. The deterrent eﬀect is the decrease in non compliance of traders
who are not the subject of the assurance activity. The total direct net additional liability
eﬀect is the revenue collected through investigations. The preventive eﬀect is the increase
in compliance in subsequent years by those traders who do receive an assurance visit. In
their study they calculate the incremental deterrent eﬀect, which is the eﬀect on the VAT
return declarations that are made by traders who are not the subject of investigation of
a one percentage change in investigations.
The measure of non-compliance adopted is the Net Additional Liability (NAL) which
would have been discovered by an assurance visit. This is estimated from the NAL
discovered by assurance visits, under the assumption that assurance visits represent a
sampling process of all traders, so that the NAL of visited traders can be expected to be
at the same level for all traders with the same risk characteristics and other parameters
(e.g. time since last visit) that determine the level of their NAL. The authors estimate a
log-linear model and regress the positive NAL on the probability of receiving an assurance
audit, the time since last visit and risk factors characterising each trader. The coeﬃcient
on the probability of receiving an assurance visit represents the elasticity of evasion for
those traders who are not subject to investigations. The obtained estimate is 0.55: a one
percent increase in the probability of an audit to all traders will induce a 0.55 per cent
decrease in non-compliance of traders who haven￿t been investigated. The authors also
calculate the values of the incremental deterrent eﬀect for diﬀerent percentage changes
in VAT assurance activity and ￿nd that investigations have diminishing returns: the
absolute value of the incremental deterrent eﬀect declines for successive equal increases
in the assurance activity.
A comparison of the ￿ndings on the eﬀects of audits on tax compliance from these
s t u d i e si sv e r yd i ﬃcult as they refer to diﬀerent levels of data aggregation, to diﬀerent
6Plumley (1996), p. 6-7.
7time periods and diﬀerent taxes. Some studies consider only one year time span, others
look at 10 years time periods. Only three studies provide estimates for the ratio between
indirect and direct eﬀects of investigations, though only two explain the methodology
used to get the result. It remains however unclear what is driving the direct and indirect
eﬀects of investigations. Hence the interpretation of the ￿ndings remains a challenge. In
the next section we set a very general model on the optimal allocation of investigation
resources and derive the expressions for the direct and indirect eﬀects in order to identify
the determinants of these eﬀects. We will use the results to comment the seemingly
contradictory ￿ndings of the empirical studies.
3 The indirect and direct eﬀects of investigations
In this section we analyse the eﬀects of an increase in the frequency of detection and
derive an expression for the direct and indirect eﬀects. We model the optimal allocation
of investigation resources across diﬀerent categories of taxpayers, when the enforcement
agency has a ￿xed budget to carry out investigations. We assume that the enforcement
agency aims at minimising the tax gap, de￿ned as the amount of evasion taking place
minus the amount recovered through investigations.
Let Nk be the number of taxpayers of type k,a n dEk the average amount of evasion
carried out by taxpayers of that type. The frequency with which the tax authority carries
out investigations of taxpayers of type k is pk. The total number of investigations carried
out on taxpayers of type k is Ik = pkNk.W e d e ￿ne the ratio of the average amount
recovered per investigation of taxpayers of type k to the average amount of evasion per
taxpayer of type k as θk
7. The cost of carrying out such an investigation is ck.W e
assume taxpayers diﬀer in the frequency with which they are investigated and in each
group their behaviour depends solely on the frequency of audit with which the group is
targeted, via the function Ek(pk).T h e r ea r em diﬀerent types of taxpayer. We measure
the responsiveness of taxpayers of type k to the audit rule in terms of the elasticity of





We should note few points before proceeding.
7T h e r ea r et w of a c t o r sb e a r i n go nt h ev a l u eo fθ for any given group. First, for a variety of reasons the
tax authority would not necessarily expect to recover in any particular investigation the full amount of
tax that is actually evaded, which would suggest θ<1. On the other hand there may be a great deal of
targeting of resources within group k so that investigations are devoted to the high end of the spectrum,
in which case we could have θ>1. Also, if the enforcement agency is carrying out an investigation over
multiple years, it might well be the case that θ>1.W h i c h v a l u e o f θ will apply in any circumstance
depends on the heterogeneity of the group and the extent to which investigations are targeted on high
yield or aﬀect a long period of time. If the group is pretty homogeneous or if taxpayers are selected more
or less at random, we would expect θ<1.
8￿ In the behavioural relationship adopted above we are not assuming that taxpayers
necessarily correctly perceive the true frequency with which their group is inspected,
just that there is some relationship between the actual frequency of inspection, the
perceived frequency of investigation and behaviour. We are not modelling these more
fundamental relationships, but we just adopt a reduced form that relates behaviour
ultimately to the actual frequency of inspection. So the elasticity de￿ned above
confounds two elasticities: the sensitivity of evasion behaviour to the perceived fre-
quency of inspection and the sensitivity of the perceived probability of inspection to
the actual frequency of inspection. It is important to distinguish between the two
elasticities as they measure diﬀerent aspects of the individual response to audits.
T h e ym a ya l s ot a k ev e r yd i ﬀerent values: an individual may be very sensitive to
the perceived odds of being investigated, but the actual probability and perceived
probability may be matched very poorly. Or the opposite might occur. Hence the
weak response to investigations which emerges from the empirical studies using in-
dividual level data we considered above, could be compatible with a high sensitivity
of evasion behaviour to perceived probability if perceive probabilities do not adjust
precisely to a change in actual probabilities. Alternatively, a low response to audits
could be due to a low sensitivity to perceived probability, even if the match between
actual and perceived probability is perfect.
￿ It is also important to recognise that the elasticity de￿ned above measures the aver-
age behavioural response of taxpayers in the same group. It is a population elasticity
rather than an individual elasticity. This has two implications. First, this allows for
considerable heterogeneity of individual sensitivity within the group. Secondly this
is consistent with the possibility that taxpayer behaviour might not be based on a
purely individualistic calculus but might be aﬀected by the proportion of taxpayers
within the group who are compliant, thus re￿ecting some kind of social norm at
work. The advantage of very reduced form speci￿cation of individual behaviour
that we have employed is that it is consistent with a wide range of deeper structural
models.
￿ In principal behaviour will depend on many factors other than the probability of
investigation. It will also depend on: the likelihood of the investigations being
eﬀective - and hence on θk; the likelihood that, if eﬀective, a penalty will be imposed.
Since here we are mainly interested in the allocation of investigation resources we do
not consider these other behavioural factors, but recognise their presence through
the fact that the elasticity can vary across groups.
9￿ On the other hand we are not allowing for the possibility that the behaviour of tax-
payers of type k depends on the frequency with which other groups are investigated
- as might be the case if people￿s perceived probability of being investigated depends
on what they hear from taxpayers in other groups about their experience.
￿ In this setting we focus purely on the number of investigations carried out. There
is also an issue of the quality of investigations. What we might expect is that there
is a quality continuum to investigations, and that higher quality investigations (i)
require more resources C; (ii) recover a higher fraction of evasion θ, and, possibly,
(iii) have a bigger impact on taxpayer behaviour, ε. It would be interesting to in-
vestigate what could be said about the optimal quality of investigations balancing
oﬀ all these considerations. However, for the purposes of this paper, the assumption
we make is that the quality of investigations - and hence C,θ,ε -i s￿xed, possibly
because managers have already chosen the optimal quality. We are not ignoring
quality and assuming that it is the cheapest, lowest cost type of investigation that
should be pursued. So, once again, the reduced form model employed here is con-
sistent with a deeper structural account of there being a spectrum of investigation
technologies.
The total expected amount of evasion by taxpayers in group k is NkEk, while, if
they are inspected with frequency pk, then the total expected compliance yield from
investigations will be NkpkθkEk. So the total tax gap from group k will be:
Gk = NkEk{1 − pkθk} (1)
The cost of investigating taxpayers in group k is ckpkNk. The objective of the enforce-
ment agency is to select the frequency of an audit for each group of taxpayers in order to
minimise the tax gap, subject to the constraint that only a limited amount of resources





{NkEk[1 − pkθk]} s.t.
m X
k=1
ckpkNk ≤ C (2)





[1 − pkθk] − θkEk
￿
+ λNkck =0 (3)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint, representing the mar-
ginal reduction in the tax gap that could be brought about by an additional unit of
resources for investigations.
10With a bit of re-arranging we can re-write (3) as:





Equation (4) characterises the optimal allocation of investigation resources. The ex-
pression on the left hand side represents the ratio of the marginal reduction in the pay-
ment/tax gap brought about by a unit increase in the frequency of inspections for group
k, to the marginal cost of a unit increase in the frequency of inspections for group k.
An optimal allocation of resources implies that the marginal bene￿t:cost ratio should
b et h es a m ea c r o s sg r o u p so ft a x p a y e r s . T h i sc o m m o nm a r g i n a lb e n e ￿t :cost ratio will
measure the marginal bene￿t of increasing resources available for investigation by 1 unit.
Equation (4) also tells us that the optimal allocation of resources is independent of the
size of the population of taxpayers in group k. It is the average yield for taxpayers in
group k that matters not total yield.
We are interested in the expression for the marginal reduction in the payment gap
(MRPG), the numerator of equation (4). We can write this as:




Equation (5) allows us to explain the direct and indirect eﬀects of investigations. The
expression shows that there are three eﬀects to be considered.
The ￿rst term of equation (5) represents the immediate yield brought in from an extra
investigation. If one extra investigation is carried out, since each investigation is expected
to yield Ekθk on average, then this is what the enforcement agency expects to get from
the extra investigation.
The second and third terms of equation (5) represent the behavioural response of all
taxpayers to an increase in the frequency of audit. A reduction in the average amount
of evasion by all taxpayers in group k , means that all investigations (and not just the
additional one) will ￿nd that the amount brought in from each investigation is now a bit
lower. This eﬀect is measured by the term εkEkθk. However a reduction in the average
amount of evasion also means that the tax gap is reduced. The term
εkEk
pk captures the
(absolute) reduction in the average amount of evasion brought about by a unit increase in
the frequency of investigations. It is inversely proportional to the frequency with which
the group is investigated. The smaller the number of investigations that the enforcement
agency currently carries out, the greater will be the percentage increase that one additional
investigation will represent. This is the compliance eﬀect of an increase on investigations8.
8We should note that here we are ignoring any timing issue, which is likely to aﬀect the direct and the
eﬀect in a diﬀerent way, in that the behavioural response to an increase in the frequency of investigations
11So which of these are the direct eﬀect and which the indirect eﬀect? There are two
possibilities. We can interpret the direct eﬀect as the eﬀect on yield, and hence consider
the ￿rst two terms in equation (5) as the direct eﬀect, or, and we believe this is more
appropriate to re￿ect what we mean by direct and indirect eﬀects, we can consider the
direct eﬀect as the immediate yield from investigations and the indirect eﬀect as the
behavioural impact of the actions of the tax authority. In this case the ￿rst term of
equation (5) represents the direct eﬀect and the second and third terms the indirect
eﬀect.
In the next subsection we derive the ratio between indirect and direct eﬀects following
from each of these two interpretations and consider how this analysis can help in clarifying
the apparently contradicting ￿gures emerging from the empirical studies we mentioned
above.
3.1 The ratio between indirect and direct eﬀects
For the calculation of the ratio between indirect and direct eﬀects the simplest under-
standing would be to say that the direct eﬀect is just the immediate yield brought in from
an extra investigation, while the indirect eﬀect is the eﬀect of this activity on changing





But this ignores the second term in equation (5). If we include the second term and
say that the direct eﬀect is about the eﬀect of investigations on yield, whereas the indirect









Notice that because, compared to the ￿r s tr a t i o ,w eh a v em a d et h ed i r e c te ﬀect smaller
and kept the indirect eﬀect the same, we have Rk2 >R k1
On the other hand, if we say that the indirect eﬀect is all about the behavioural impact
of the enforcement agency actions, then we should consider the second and third terms













is going to be observed later than the direct eﬀect on the discovered evasion. For simplicity here we only
consider one period, thereby modelling a steady state.
12Because, relative to the ￿r s tm e a s u r e ,w eh a v en o wm a d et h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect smaller
and kept the direct eﬀect the same we have Rk1 >R k3
9. As already anticipated our view
is that the third ratio is the closest to capturing the spirit of what we mean by the direct
and indirect eﬀects.
The most important point is that, whatever the de￿nition one adopts, there is ab-
solutely no reason to think that this ratio is constant across ￿scal areas. Indeed there
is absolutely no reason to think that this ratio is going to be constant across diﬀerent
taxpayer groups within a ￿scal area. For even if we thought that the behavioural elastic-
ity, ε, was relatively constant across groups, the ratio depends on an operational/resource
decision - how intensively to investigate taxpayers, p, and on the operational eﬀectiveness
of fraud investigations, θ, both of which will certainly vary both across and within ￿scal
areas.
It￿s worth noting that a high ratio is consistent with a low behavioural response, if the
coverage rate is suﬃciently low. This could explain the contradictory ￿ndings of Tauchen
et al. (1989), who report a very high estimate for the ratio between indirect and direct
eﬀects but a very low elasticity of declared income with respect to the audit rate.
H o wd ot h e s er e s u l t sr e l a t et ot h e￿ndings of the empirical studies we considered
above?
First of all we should notice that the ￿gures provided in the empirical studies on the
ratio between indirect and direct eﬀects are calculated using a very diﬀerent approach to
that we employed in our model. One diﬀerence with our approach is that these authors
do not consider a marginal increase in the audit rate, but a 1 percentage point increase.
Tauchen et al.(1989) consider a rise in the audit rate for high income wage and salaries
workers from 10.4% to 11.4%, i.e. an increase by 110%. Dubin et al. (1990) calculate
the indirect eﬀects if the audit rate had remained to its 1977 value, a change from 1%t o
1.88%, equivalent to an increase of 188%. Plumley (1996) considers the eﬀects of raising
the frequency of investigations from 0.65% to 1.65%, hence an increase by 254%. A second
diﬀerence is that these authors do not use a formula to calculate the ratio, but directly
calculate it from their estimated equations.
Both Plumley (1996) and Dubin et al. (1990) calculate it as the ratio between the
change in total amount of evasion undertaken by taxpayers and the change in the com-
pliance yield from investigations. Hence the ratio calculated is the analogue of the ratio
9We derive these ratios under the assumption that the tax authority does not have enough information
on how taxpayers diﬀer in one group and hence cannot target speci￿c taxpayers. This implies that the
audit is random within a given group. However, as we show in the Appendix, under some general
conditions, the above expressions are not greatly aﬀected, even if we allow for the possibility that the tax
authority can target investigation resources and select, within a given group, those taxpayers with higher
expected evasion.
13R2. The estimate for Plumley it is 11:1. This is an average value, as it considers average
changes. Using 1991 parameters valued and considering a 1% change in the audit rate
we derived a ratio indirect/direct eﬀect of 8.54. For Tauchen et al. the average ratio is
30:110. Dubin et al. report a ratio equal to 6:1. These estimates are quite diﬀerent, but
they all con￿rm the overwhelming role of the indirect eﬀects. The ￿gures may seem quite
high, but, in the light of what we illustrated above, this is not surprising. The important
point to bear in mind is that the direct eﬀect operates on people who are investigated
whereas the indirect eﬀect operates on the whole population (or group). Given that only
a small proportion is investigated, this factor in itself tends to make the indirect eﬀect
much larger than the direct eﬀect, as our formulation shows. We can also explain the
diﬀerence in values provided: as equation (7) shows, it is possible to observe diﬀerent
ratios across districts/states and across time if the elasticity of evasion, the probability
and the eﬀectiveness of audits vary across states or across time. We know that the prob-
ability of audit was diﬀerent across the diﬀerent studies. We do not have any estimate
for the eﬀectiveness of audits, apart from Plumley. For the elasticity of evasion we do
not have an estimate for these models. When it is calculated, the elasticity is not the
evasion elasticity as in our model, but it is the elasticity of reported income or reported
tax liabilities. Tauchen et al. (1989) using data aggregated at district level (for the tax
year 1979) report an elasticity of declared income with respect to the audit rate equal to
0.19. As the authors do not explain their results it is not possible to translate it in an
evasion elasticity. From the details available in Plumley, who uses panel data at state level
(from 1982 to 1991), we were able to calculate the elasticity of evasion. If the calculation
is performed on average values the elasticity is about 0.7. A calculation based on 1991
parameters values gives a ￿gure of 0.56.
An average elasticity of evasion of 0.7, as obtained from Plumley may seem quite a
high value. However, the estimate is like our term εk: it is a population elasticity. This
elasticity may capture quite diﬀerent aspects of individual behaviour. One important
aspect could be the role of social interactions in a community of taxpayers: individuals
may be aﬀected by the number of other people being compliant and this may translate
in a greater response to investigations at the level of the whole community. In the next
section we want to explore this idea in detail. This argument could conciliate the con-
trasting ￿ndings from micro level studies and more aggregate analysis on the value of the
behavioural elasticities.
10The authors report an increase in tax revenues due to the improved compliance of taxpayers almost
three times the direct revenue yield for an increase in the audit rate from 10.4% to 11.4%. Assuming a
linear relationship between the audit probability and the indirect yield and ignoring second order eﬀects,
this would imply a ratio indirect/direct eﬀects of approximately 30:1.
144 Tax compliance as a social norm and the impact of
an increase in the frequency of audits
The idea that tax compliance does not only rely on deterrence and economic factors, but
it is also aﬀected by moral considerations and social interactions, has been explored in
some recent developments of the theoretical literature on tax evasion and has been tested
in recent empirical studies. The assumption made by the theoretical models and tested
in the empirical studies is that individuals may be induced to be honest on the grounds
of moral considerations and/or social pressure. This is typically modelled by introducing
non-monetary factors as extra arguments in the utility function11.T h e ￿ndings from
laboratory experiments and surveys seem all to converge to the view that there is indeed a
social dimension in the subjects￿ decision whether or not to comply. There is evidence that
many countries with similar ￿scal systems have diﬀerent compliance experiences. Torgler
(2002) reviews some laboratory experiments and draws the following conclusions: ￿...(i)
individuals who comply tend to view tax evasion as immoral, (ii) compliance is higher if
moral appeals are made to the taxpayer, (iii) individuals with tax evaders as friends are
more likely to be evaders themselves, and (iv) compliance is greater in societies with a
stronger sense of social cohesion.￿(p. 664).
However, how individuals￿ attitudes actually translate into behaviour still remains
to be explained. Results from a ￿eld experiment on the role of normative appeals on
social conscience in deterring tax evasion, conducted on 60,000 US taxpayers, suggest
that evaders are more likely to be individuals with higher opportunities to evade and
these are the ones who seem to be less aﬀected by normative appeals12.T h ec r u c i a lr o l e
of opportunities in determining the choice of evaders and also of non-￿lers is con￿rmed
by other laboratory experiments and econometric studies13.
In this section we want to analyse how the decision whether or not to evade is aﬀected
by the tax parameters and opportunities to evade and how their impact changes when tax
compliance assumes the characteristics of a social norm. We assume tax compliance is a
code of behaviour in the community of taxpayers, although we do not model how it may
emerge and remain establish. Diﬀerent factors could be responsible for the emergence
of tax compliance as a social norm. The underlying idea is that taxpayers care about
how many other individuals evade tax, and this could be because they care about their
reputation within the community or because they are concerned that each member in
the community pays their fair contribution to tax revenues. Following Myles and Naylor
11Benjamini and Maital (1985) and Gordon (1989) analyse the role of psychic costs in deterring tax
evasion and Myles and Naylor (1996) analyse tax compliance as a social norm.
12See Blumenthal et al. (2001).
13See Slemrod et al. (2001), Crane and Nourzad (1993) and Erard and Ho (2001).
15(1996), we assume that there exist an extra source of utility from not evading and this is
increasing in the number of taxpayers behaving honestly. In terms of the previous analysis
on the allocation of investigation resources, here we examine the behaviour of individuals
belonging to the same group k. To keep notation simple we omit the subscript k,b u t
when we refer to the community of taxpayers, where the social norm is at work, we mean
those taxpayers in group k.
We are interested in analysing how the behavioural response to an increase in the
probability of an audit is aﬀected by the diﬀerent assumptions we make on how taxpayers
may be motivated to cheat.
We compare three settings: one in which tax compliance is simply an opportunistic
behaviour, based on individual calculus. We distinguish the case of the standard portfolio
model where the loss from being caught is simply the pecuniary ￿ne charged by the tax
authority, from the case where the ￿ne has a broader interpretation and it also incorporates
the psychic cost of being investigated, which can vary across taxpayers. In the second
setting we allow for a warm glow from tax compliance. If the individual does not evade
she/he bene￿ts from an extra non-pecuniary utility gain from being honest. In the third
setting we assume that tax compliance is a social norm, regarded as a code of behaviour
in the relevant community: an individual, in making the choice whether or not to evade,
is also in￿uenced by the fraction of the taxpayers in the population who are compliant.
We analyse the eﬀect of an increase in the frequency of investigations on the overall
compliance in these three cases.
We assume risk neutrality, as we want to abstract from any risk considerations and
focus on the eﬀects of non monetary considerations and social interactions on tax compli-
ance. This assumption is not crucial for our qualitative results. We analyse the decision
whether or not to evade rather than the decision how much to evade, hence we do not
consider why people can evade diﬀerent amounts, but rather how people decide to be
compliant or not.
4.1 Sel￿sh calculus.
We ￿rst consider the setting of the standard portfolio model, where the taxpayer decides
whether or not to evade on the basis of a sel￿sh and purely monetary calculus.
4.1.1 Individual behaviour
We ￿rst focus our analysis at the individual level.
We de￿ne the utility from non evading for an individual with income y and facing a
tax rate t as:
U
NE = y(1 − t) (9)
16Let e, 0 ≤ e ≤ y, be the individual￿s opportunity to evade, i.e. the amount of income
that can potentially be hidden and e e, 0 ≤ e e ≤ e, the actual amount evaded. An individual
is investigated with probability p, 0 <p<1, and in case of evasion he/she will need to
pay back the taxes due and a monetary ￿ne F>0 on the amount of evaded income, e e
(as in Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Hence the utility from evading is:
U
E = p[y(1 − t) − Fe e]+( 1− p)[(y − e e)(1 − t)+e e]=y(1 − t)+e e[t(1 − p) − pF] (10)
An individual is willing to evade if UE >U NE. Hence tax evasion will occur whenever
if e e[t(1 − p) − pF] > 0.I f t(1 − p) − pF > 0 the expected ￿nancial gain from evading
one extra unit of income is positive and the taxpayer will always evade to the maximum
amount, so e e = e14. The expression t(1−p)−pF is decreasing in F, so that there will be
an F such that t(1−p)−pF =0 . For this particular value of the ￿ne rate the individual
will be indiﬀerent between evasion and non evasion. Hence, F =
t(1−p)
p de￿nes the critical
value above which an individual will opt for full compliance, as, above F, t(1−p)−pF<0
and tax evasion is not pro￿table. If taxpayers face the same tax parameters there will
be a unique value of F above which everybody will evade, even if their income diﬀers. As
long as taxpayers have an opportunity to hide their income (e>0) a mixed equilibrium of
evaders and non-evaders is not possible. Also, the only way to aﬀect the decision whether
or not to evade is to vary F . In this case, in fact, opportunities to evade are exogenous in
that they are not aﬀected by any of the tax parameters: the critical level of opportunity
for which UE = UNE is e =0 . Evasion will occur whenever e>015.
We illustrate this in ￿gure 1.
An increase in the probability of detection will aﬀect the decision whether or not
to evade only if the population of taxpayers is just indiﬀerent between evasion and non
evasion, i.e. if the value of the ￿ne rate is exactly F =
t(1−p)
p . In this case, an increase
in the probability of detection will make everybody to opt for full-compliance.
Pecuniary loss for being investigated. The act of being caught evading may imply
some loss in reputation or some psychic cost for feeling guilty or ashamed. This non
p e c u n i a r yc o s ti sv e r yl i k e l yt od i ﬀer across individuals: the loss of reputation for being
caught evading may be higher for a person with a high public pro￿le, or the feeling of
guilt or shame may be quite personal and diﬀer across individuals, regardless of their
occupation. In what follows we assume that the ￿ne rate also includes a non pecuniary
14We should note that here both the probability of detection p and the ￿ne rate F are ￿xed and do
not depend on the amount of evasion. In reality both the frequency of an audit and the ￿ne rate are
positively related to the amount of concealed income. This may imply that tax evaders do not evade to
the maximum extent of their possibilities.

















Figure 1:S e l ￿sh Calculus: the individual compliance decision.
18cost, ζi which varies across taxpayers. We represent this broader concept of the ￿ne rate
as f = F + ζi. The expected ￿nancial gain from evading one extra unit of income will
therefore be t(1−p)−p(F +ζi), which is decreasing in both F and ζi. Like before, there
will be a threshold level f such that t(1−p)−pf =0 ,above which an individual will opt
for full compliance. This threshold level corresponds to F =
t(1−p)
p −ζi and will therefore
vary across individuals depending on ζi. This implies that it will be possible to observe
some individuals opting for evasion and others being fully compliant even if they face the
same tax parameters. A mixed equilibrium of evaders and non-evaders will be possible.
In ￿gure 1 we represent the threshold level of the ￿ne above which individual i,w h o
suﬀers a non pecuniary loss ζi for being audited, will not evade.
4.1.2 The Community
I nt h ec a s eo fam o n e t a r y￿ne, applied to the amount of evaded income, the behaviour
of a single individual also represents the behaviour of the whole community. In fact, if
individuals face the same tax parameters, there will be a unique value of the ￿ne rate
above which everybody will be fully compliant and below which everybody will evade.
T h ea n a l y s i si sm o r ei n t e r e s t i n gw h e nt h e￿ne rate also includes a non pecuniary cost,
which may vary across individuals, as we have noted above. Here we analyse overall
evasion in a community where individuals diﬀer in the psychic cost of being investigated.
We assume taxpayers diﬀer in the opportunity to conceal income, e, the non pecuniary
￿ne for being audited ζi,a n di n c o m ey. The density function for e is g(e) and for f is
h(f).S i n c e y doesn￿t aﬀect any decision, its distribution is irrelevant. We de￿ne f as
the threshold level of the ￿ne below which tax evasion is pro￿table. This corresponds to
F =
t(1−p)
p − ζi. Some individuals will have ζi such that they will be above f and some












Eﬀect of an increase in the probability of detection on overall evasion The
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A change in the probability of detection will aﬀect those on the margin, who were
indiﬀerent between evasion and non evasion, h(f).
The magnitude of the impact of a rise in the audit rate on evasion depends on the
distribution of the psychic cost. The greater the number of people who were previously
19indiﬀerent between evading and being fully compliant, the greater the impact of a rise in
the audit rate on tax evasion. Hence, for a given value of p and E,t h eg r e a t e rt h en u m b e r
of people who before the change in the audit rate were indiﬀerent between evasion and
non evasion, the higher the value of the elasticity of evasion.
4.2 Non-sel￿sh considerations and tax compliance
We now consider a setting where the compliance decision is not merely based on sel￿sh
calculus, but an individual recognises the importance of paying taxes, for example because
he/she values the provision of public goods, and/or regards honest behaviour as morally
right. We represent this in terms of a warm glow for behaving honestly, modelled as a
constant parameter in the utility from non evading. We keep the assumption that the
￿ne rate also include a non-monetary cost for being investigated.
4.2.1 Individual behaviour
Let ω be the warm glow from being honest. The utility from non-evading is:
U
NE = y(1 − t)+ω (13)
As before, the utility from evading is:
U
E = p[y(1 − t) − fe e]+( 1− p)[(y − e e)(1 − t)+e e]=y(1 − t)+e e[t(1 − p) − pf] (14)
An individual will evade tax if the utility from evading is greater than the utility
from non evading, i.e. if e e[t(1 − p) − pf] >ωand will evade to the maximum of his
opportunities (e e = e)i ft h e￿ne is below the threshold f16.If there is a warm glow from
behaving honestly, the entry condition for tax evasion is more restrictive: opportunities
must exceed a threshold level, which is de￿ned by the tax parameters and the warm glow
for inducing an individuals to evade:
e(f)=
ω
t − p(f + t)
(15)
Full compliance will occur if e ≤ e(f).T w oc h a n n e l sa ﬀect now the decision whether
or not to evade: e, which depends on p,f,a n dt,a n df.
An increase in p will aﬀect both f and e.I n￿gure 2 we represent the decision whether
or not to evade for an individual with a non pecuniary cost of being caught equal to ζi. e
is an increasing function of the ￿ne rate and tends to in￿nity when f = f .The individual
will engage in tax evasion whenever his opportunities to evade are above the curve e.N o t e
that in the area below the curve e and to the left of f the expected gain from one extra
unit of evaded income is positive but the warm glow from being compliant outweigh this
gain and the individual is not willing to evade.






















Figure 2: Moral considerations and the compliance decision.
214.2.2 The Community.
Within the community all those taxpayers for whom f<f and e>e (f) will evade. So













Eﬀect of an increase in the probability of detection on overall evasion As we
anticipated above there are now two channels through which an increase in the probability
of detection will aﬀect the tax compliance decision. In fact a change in the probability














t − p(f + t)
(17)
The ￿rst term on the right hand side of equation (17) is the eﬀect of a change in the
probability of detection on f: an increase in the probability of detection will lower f,
making tax evasion less pro￿table on the margin. The second term is the eﬀect on the
critical value of opportunities to evade: an increase in the probability of detection will
increase e, making the entry condition for evasion more restrictive. We illustrate the eﬀect
of an increase in the probability of detection on an individual￿s willingness to evade in
￿gure 3. An increase from p to p0 will shift the curve e = ω
t−p(f+t) upwards and f leftwards
and total evasion will decrease.
The distribution of f and e are crucial in determining the magnitude of the impact
of the audit probability on evasion. The greater the number of taxpayers on the margin
(g(e) and h(f)), the greater the impact of the audit rate on evasion. For given values of
tax evasion and of the audit rate, a higher number of taxpayers on the margin implies a
higher elasticity of evasion.
4.3 Tax compliance as a social norm
We now relax the assumption that tax compliance is an individualistic choice, taken with
no considerations for the behaviour of other taxpayers. We assume tax compliance is a
social norm and individuals bene￿t from conforming to it. In particular, the number of
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Figure 3: Moral considerations: the eﬀect of an increase in the probability of detection
on compliance.
234.3.1 Individual behaviour
Following Myles and Naylor (1996) we assume that when an individual pays his taxes
honestly he gets two extra sources of utility, a social custom utility and a warm glow.
For an individual with income y and facing a tax rate t, the utility from non evading is
represented by:
U
NE = y(1 − t)+b(1 − µ)+ω (18)
where µ, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, is the proportion of the population who evades, b(1 − µ) is the
utility of conforming with the group of honest taxpayers: we can think of it in terms of
a non-pecuniary gain from enhancing one￿s reputation within the community by being
honest. In line with the social custom approach17 , reputation depends on the proportion
of individuals who believe in a given code of behaviour, so that the larger the number
of believers the more reputation is lost by disobedience of the code. b ≥ 0 is the weight
attached to the social norm and ω ≥ 0 is the warm glow from behaving honestly. It
is important to keep the two eﬀects separate as they imply quite diﬀerent mechanisms
of enforcement. In the case of a warm glow the mechanism of enforcement relies on
the inhibitory power of personal conscience and civic responsibility. Individuals hold a
personal conviction towards non evasion and are prepared to adhere to it, even if the other
members of the community cannot observe any cheating activity. In the case of a loss in
reputation for evading, the mechanism of enforcement relies instead on the community￿s
behaviour and the greater the number of individuals complying with their tax duties
the greater the loss for stepping out of the social norm. This re￿ects the distinction
emphasised by sociological theories of social control (Grasmick-Green (1980) and Wrong
(1961)) between the inhibitory power of moral commitment to the law and the inhibitory
power of the threat of social disapproval. The utility from evasion is as before:
U
E = p[y(1 − t) − fe e]+( 1− p)[(y − e e)(1 − t)+e e]=y(1 − t)+e e[t(1 − p) − pf] (19)
If f<f, i.e. t(1−p) >p f, the individual will evade to the maximum of his possibilities,
so e e = e. If this inequality were not true, then penalties alone would be enough to prevent
evasion and we would have no need to invoke social norms. Hence the utility from evading
is18
U
E = y(1 − t)+e[t(1 − p) − pf] (20)
17See Akerlof (1980) and Cowell (1990)
18In this model we assume that once the individual has opted for evasion, he chooses the amount
of evasion as in the standard model, on the basis of the expected ￿nancial gain. The model could be
enriched by allowing evaders to decide on the amount of evasion also on the basis of how much evasion
is carried out by other individuals in their peer group. In this case the relative amount of evasion would
be an additional argument in the utility from evasion. However this modi￿cation of the model wouldn￿t
qualitatively aﬀect our results.
24So an individual will evade tax if the utility from evading is greater than the utility
from non evading. This occurs if the opportunity to evade e exceeds a threshold value e :
e>e=
b(1 − µ)+ω
t − p(f + t)
(21)
Notice that the entry condition for tax evasion is more restrictive than in the previous
settings. The greater the importance attached to the social custom, the greater will be
e. Whereas a greater proportion of evaders (µ) is associated with a lower e which implies
that the entry condition for evasion becomes less restrictive as the number of dishonest
taxpayers increases.
In ￿gure 4 we represent the compliance decision of two diﬀerent individuals who face
the same tax parameters, have the same opportunities to evade, attach the same impor-
tance to the social norm and get the same warm glow for being honest but suﬀer diﬀerent
non pecuniary costs in case they are caught cheating. In particular, taxpayer 1 bears a
non pecuniary cost if caught evading ζ1w h i c hi sl e s st h a nt h ec o s ts u ﬀered by taxpayer
2, ζ2. For an equal monetary ￿ne imposed by the tax authority, taxpayer 2 will bear a
higher cost for being caught cheating, i.e. f2 = F +ζ2 >f 1 = F +ζ1 and hence, for each
level of the ￿ne rate in the interval 0 <f<f the threshold level of opportunities above
which taxpayer 2 will consider to evade will be higher, i.e. the e2curve lies to the left of
e1. The shaded area in ￿gure 4 represents the greater willingness to evade by taxpayer 1,
which is due to the lower psychic cost of being caught. Figure 4 could also represent the
same taxpayer who has to decide two diﬀerent strategies of non-compliance: whether or
not to overstate expenses or whether or not to understate income. The two strategies may
imply diﬀerent costs of being caught cheating, but if the individual decides to be honest
in both cases he gets the same utility gains from reputational concerns and conforming
with honest behaviour. If the stigma from being caught overstating one￿s expenses is
lower than the stigma for understating one￿s income, the individual will be more willing
to overstating expenses. And if his opportunities lie in the shaded area, he will be willing
to overstate his expenses but not to underdeclare his income.
4.3.2 The community







































































Figure 4: The compliance decision for diﬀerent non pecuniary costs of being caught.









t − p(f + t)
g(e)
‚
h(f)df ≥ 0 (24)














which is independent of b, though, for µ<1 an increase in b will increase e which will
lower m. The equilibrium value of µ, b µ,i sg i v e nb y
b µ = m(b µ;f,p,t) (26)
It occurs when the distribution of evasion opportunities is such that, if every individual
faces the same proportion of evaders b µ, the actual proportion of evaders in the whole
economy, m(b µ;f,p,t), will be just b µ, i.e. b µ is a ￿xed point for m(b µ;•).I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
an equilibrium in the whole community occurs when, given the actual proportion of tax
evaders in the population, no one has an incentive to switch from evasion to non-evasion,
or vice versa.
Hence an equilibrium with zero evasion will occur when, given that nobody evades,
nobody will ever consider to evade. Formally:
Condition 1: b µ =0is an equilibrium if, and only if, for all e and f with h(f) > 0 and
g(e) > 0
U
E = y(1 − t)+e e[t(1 − p) − pf] ≤ y(1 − t)+b(1) + ω (27)
If F<
t(1−p)
p − ζi.for all taxpayers then e e = e and this condition becomes:
e ≤
b(1) + ω
t − p(f + t)
Even if the monetary ￿ne for evading is so low that the expected net gain from an extra
unit of evaded income is positive for all taxpayers, opportunities to evade are too low to
pro￿tably engage in tax evasion and nobody will ever evade.
Similarly an equilibrium with full evasion will occur if nobody will ever consider not
to evade when the observed behaviour is full evasion. Formally:
Condition 2: b µ =1is an equilibrium if, and only if, for all e and f with h(f) > 0 and
g(e) > 0,
U
E = y(1 − t)+e e[t(1 − p) − pf] >y (1 − t)+b(0) + ω (28)
27If F<
t(1−p)
p − ζi.for all taxpayers then e e = e and this condition becomes:
e>
b(0) + ω
t − p(f + t)
Full evasion will occur when the monetary ￿ne for evading is so low and opportunity
to evade are so high that everybody will ￿nd it pro￿table to evade.
Which of these two conditions is satis￿ed depends on how opportunities to evade
the non-monetary cost of being caught are distributed across the population. For given
distributions of opportunities and non-monetary costs of being caught, the zero evasion
equilibrium is more likely the higher the probability of detection and the monetary ￿ne.
The structure of the equilibrium depends on whether only one, both of neither of these
conditions hold. There are four diﬀerent cases:
￿ If only condition (27) holds then b µ =0will be a unique equilibrium if m(µ) <µfor
all µ>0. Otherwise there is also at least one other interior equilibrium since m(µ)
must cross the 450line before µ =1 .
￿ If only condition (28) holds then b µ =1will be a unique equilibrium if m(µ) >µfor
all µ<1. Otherwise there must be at lest one other interior equilibrium.
￿ If both (27) and (28) hold then two possibilities can arise: either a) b µ =0 , b µ =1
constitute the unique set of equilibria, or b) b µ =0 , b µ =1are equilibria and there are
interior equilibria between these points. It is suﬃcient for b) that either m0(0) ≥ 1
and m0(1) ≥ 1 or that m0(0) ≤ 1 and m0(1) ≤ 1.
￿ If neither conditions hold there are only interior equilibria and these will be in odd
number.
The more spread are the distributions of opportunities to evade and of non-monetary
costs for being caught, the more likely is that neither conditions hold and there are only
interior equilibria.
In what follows we focus on a unique interior equilibrium and consider the comparative
statics for a change in the audit rate. We make the assumption that neither (27) nor (28)
hold and that m0 > 0 and m00 =0 . Results are however valid for any locally stable interior
equilibrium. The equilibrium is represented in ￿gure 5.
The function m(µ) is represented by AB. The equilibrium occurs at the intersection
of AB with the 45◦ line (b µ).
It is easy to see that
δb µ
δb < 0 since an increase in b pivots the line AB down through the
point B. In fact, an increase in b implies, for µ 6=1 ,ag r e a t e re, i.e. for a given observed









Figure 5: The equilibrium proportion of tax evaders
5 the line A0B represents the function m(µ) for a higher b. The new equilibrium implies a
lower proportion of evaders. So the more people care about the social custom, the fewer
evade tax.
Eﬀect of an increase in the probability of detection on overall evasion. We
want to know how the amount of evasion is aﬀected by the probability of detection.
Notice ￿rst of all that an increase in p raises e for all values of µ and so shifts the
schedule AB down, thus lowering b µ, i.e.
δb µ









Notice that the qualitative prediction does not depend on the presence of social norms
and would be true even if b =0 . However, the magnitude of the eﬀect does depend on
the presence of social norm considerations, since, as we saw, δm
δb µ is increasing in b.
T h er e a s o ni sc l e a r .A ni n c r e a s ei np causes the marginal individuals to stop evading;
this lowers the proportion who evade, which in turns reduces evasion - and so on. The
larger is b t h em o r et h i se ﬀect ratchets up.
29By diﬀerentiating (22) with respect to the p, we get that the impact of a change in
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Notice that the ￿rst two eﬀects are the eﬀects that would arise in the absence of social
norms, if individuals only got a warm glow from non evading. The third argument on the
right hand side is the additional eﬀect arising because of social norm considerations. It
would be zero if b =0 , and is strictly increasing in b. This is for two reasons: an increase
in b raises the coeﬃcient on
δb µ
δp as well as raising the magnitude of this response.
In ￿gure 6 we decompose the eﬀect of a rise in the audit rate in the case where tax
compliance assumes the characteristics of a social norm. The line AscBscrepresents the
proportion of those taxpayers who are willing to evade as a function of those who are
actually evading. The initial equilibrium is at point b µ. If individuals do not care about
the social custom, i.e. b =0 , and they only get a warm glow from tax compliance, the
number of those who are willing to evade is not related to those who are actually evading
and the relevant schedule for m is AwgBwg. If the initial equilibrium is b µ, a rise in the audit
rate will shift both lines parallel downwards. The movement from b µ to b µ
0
wg represents
the ￿rst two eﬀects of equation (30) and is the decrease in the number of evaders in the
case of just a warm glow mechanism. The movement from b µ
0
wg to b µ
0
sc represents the third
term in the right hand side of equation (30) and is the extra eﬀect of a rise in the audit
rate due to the social norm. Notice that the magnitude of this third eﬀect depends on the
slope of the line AscBsc, which is determined by b, the importance attached to the social
norm.
In conclusion, if people care about the social norm then an increase in p will cause the
fraction of the population who evade to fall, and this will give an extra reason for people
to stop evading over and above the normal deterrence eﬀects. Moreover, the more people
care about the social norm, the greater will be the fall in the proportion who evade. But,
in addition, the more weight that people give to this eﬀect, the more this will cause people
on the margin to stop evading19. For a given value of p and E the elasticity of evasion
will be greater the greater the importance attached to the social custom.
In our model we assume that the b parameter is equal across all taxpayers, but more
realistically the importance attached to the social norm is likely to vary across diﬀerent
19We should note that this analysis applies when there is a unique, locally stable equilibrium. In the
presence of multiple equilibria we wouldn￿t be able to use our comparative statics as an increase in the
probability of detection would shift the density function down and some initial equilibria might disappear,
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of an increase in the audit rate on the number of evaders. Comparison
between the social norm case and the warm glow case.
31groups of taxpayers and hence we should expect a heterogeneous response of taxpayers to
a rise in the audit rate, even if all other parameters are the same. This could explain the
diﬀerent ￿ndings of the empirical studies we consider in section 2: by looking at diﬀerent
time periods and diﬀerent sections of the population of taxpayers, estimates are likely
to capture a diﬀerent magnitude of response. In particular, the value of the elasticity of
evasion is very likely to be diﬀerent across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers considered in the
studies.
If the importance attached to the social norm varies across taxpayers, an important
issue is how this would aﬀect the allocation of investigation resources. How could the
enforcement agency take advantage of the greater behavioural response, i.e. the greater
indirect eﬀect, of taxpayers sensitive to the social norm? Would this necessarily imply to
put more resources where the social norm argument is more compelling?
In the next section we consider two groups of taxpayers, where tax compliance is
regarded as a social norm to a diﬀerent extent and, by use of simulations, show the
implications for the optimal allocation of investigation resources.
5 Allocating investigation resources between two groups
with diﬀerent evasion elasticities: a simulation.
We consider two groups of taxpayers, 1 and 2. Individuals in group 1 regard tax com-
pliance as a social norm, b,ω 6=0 . Whereas individuals in group 2 do not attach any
importance to the social custom, b = ω =0 . From our previous analysis we know that
the entry condition for evasion for group 1 is more restrictive than for group 2, hence we
should expected a greater average evasion in group 2, E2 >E 1.
In this setting the programme of the enforcement agency is:
min
p1,p2
N1E1(p1)(1 − p1θ1)+N2E2(p2)(1 − p2θ2)
s.t C1N1p1 + C2N2p2 ≤ C
The ￿rst order conditions are:








The solution depends on the values of the parameters. In what follows we run two
simulations, each with three scenarios with diﬀerent parameter values. Table 1 presents
32our ￿rst simulation. For convenience we de￿ne group 1 as ￿individuals￿ and group 2 as
￿corporations￿. In the ￿rst scenario we assume that both groups have the same elasticity
of evasion, ε, and the average amount of evasion in both groups, E, is observed and is
substantially higher for corporations (100 times higher than for individuals). We derive
the optimal probability of an audit, p, under the assumption that the functional form for
the average evasion is Ei = αip
−εi
i . The optimal coverage rate for individuals is 0.6% and
for corporations 18.9%. This gives an aggregate enforcement resource allocation of £56m
to individuals and £944m to corporations.
In scenario 2 we assume a much smaller value of the elasticity of evasion for corpo-
rations (0.1 instead of 0.5). This could be due to the fact that companies attach less
importance to the social norm. All other parameters are the same as in scenario 1.T h e
change to the allocation compared to scenario 1 is slight. The values for the audit prob-
abilities are 0.7% for individuals and 18.7% for corporations and the allocation is £66m
and £934m.
In scenario 3, where the evasion elasticity for corporations is reduced to 0.01,t h e r ei s
still little change. Over 93% of total resources are still allocated to corporations. This is
because average evasion for corporations is so high relative to individuals that the direct
eﬀect of investigations always dominates the combined direct and indirect eﬀects for in-
dividuals and most resources are optimally allocated to investigate corporations.
33Simulation 1
Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3
Same epsilon Corp less elastic Corp much less elastic
Indivs Corps Indivs Corps Indivs Corps
Assumptions N (million) 91 91 9 1
c 1000 5000 1000 5000 1000 5000
theta 53 53 5 3
elasticity of evasion 0 . 50 . 5 0 . 50 . 1 0 . 5 0 . 0 1
Choice var p 0.006214 0.188815 0.007355 0.18676 0.007708 0.1861248
Dependent var E 500 50000 460 50055 449 50007
Lagrangian term direct 2500 150000 2298 150164 2245 150022
2nd term -1250 -75000 -1149 -15016 -1122 -1500
3rd term 40231 132405 31241 26802 29119 2687
indirect 38981 57405.02 30092 11785 27997 1187
total 41481 207405 32390 161949 30242 151208
lambda 41.481 41.481 32.38987 32.38987 30.24161 30.241613
Constraint Resource all. (m) 56 944 66 934 69 931
budget (m) 1000 1000 1000
Table 1 - Simulation 1: optimal allocation of investigation resources within two groups
of taxpayers with diﬀerent elasticities of evasion.
In the second simulation, which is represented in table 2, the value of average evasion
for corporations is reduced from 50,000 to 5,000 (only 10 times higher than for individu-
als). The elasticities and all the other parameter values in each scenario are the same as in
our ￿rst simulation. In this case the share of the total resources allocated to corporations
decreases from 54% to 38% from scenario 1 to scenario 2, and further to 23% in scenario
3. The greater indirect eﬀect of investigations for individuals plays now a major role for
the marginal reduction in the payment gap and the optimal allocation of resources is such
that more resources are devoted to investigate individuals than corporations.
34Simulation 2
Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3
Same epsilon Corp less elastic Corp much less elastic
Indivs Corps Indivs Corps Indivs Corps
Assumptions N (million) 91 91 9 1
c 1000 5000 1000 5000 1000 5000
theta 53 53 5 3
epsilon 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.01
Choice var p 0.051179 0.107878 0.069283 0.075291 0.085776 0.0456034
Dependent var E 500 5000 430 5183 386 5043
Lagrangian term direct 2500 15000 2149 15549 1931 15130
2nd term -1250 -7500 -1074 -1555 -966 -151
3rd term 4885 23174 3101 6884 2251 1106
indirect 3635 15674 2027 5329 1286 955
total 6135 30674 4176 20878 3217 16084
lambda 6.13485 6.13485 4.175678 4.175678 3.216861 3.2168609
Constraint Resource all. (m) 461 539 624 376 772 228
budget (m) 1000 1000 1000
Table 2 - Simulation 2: optimal allocation of investigation resources between two groups
of taxpayers with diﬀerent elasticitity of evasion.
In table 3 we consider how the optimal allocation of resources varies with the budget
available to conduct investigations. The analysis is based on the parameters for simula-
tion 2, scenario 2, gradually increasing the enforcement agency￿s budget constraint, from
£1m to £5,000m. Initially most of the enforcement resources are put into individuals.
For a budget of £1m, 95% of the resources are devoted to individuals and for a budget
of £100m, still 87.4% of the resources go into individuals. However, owing to the strong
deterrent eﬀect of investigations, the average level of evasion for the individuals quickly
decreases and it becomes advantageous to switch resources to companies, primarily in
order to obtain the direct yield. For a budget of £ 2,500m there is a switch in the audit
probability and resources from individuals to corporations.
35Simulation 3
budget p-indiv p-corp Res all.-indivRes all-corpE-indiv E-corp
m% % % % m m
Scenario 2 5000 11.37 79.5 20.5 79.5 335 4095
Budget growth path 1 0.01 0.001 95 5 11010 12655
10 0.11 0.01 94.1 5.9 3498 9887
100 0.97 0.25 87.4 12.6 1148 7282
1000 6.93 7.53 62.4 37.6 430 5183
2500 9.94 32.1 35.8 64.2 359 4483
5000 11.37 79.54 20.5 79.5 335 4095
Table 3 - Optimal allocation of investigation resources for diﬀerent values of the
enforcement agency￿s budget constraint.
We have considered the optimal allocation of investigation resources between two
groups of taxpayers, one group where tax compliance assumes the characteristics of a
social norm and the other group with no such considerations. The ￿ndings from our
simulations suggest that the decision how to optimally allocate investigation resources
depends on the average evasion and on the elasticity of evasion in each group. The higher
the average evasion in one group, the more substantial the direct eﬀect of investigations
and the more resources should be allocated to that group. In fact the direct eﬀect tends
to outweigh the combined direct and indirect eﬀect in the other group. In this case the
elasticity of evasion has less of a role in the decision on how to target diﬀerent groups of
taxpayers. As the diﬀerence in the direct eﬀect across groups of taxpayers gets smaller,
evasion elasticities assume a more important role. The results also show that there are
diminishing returns from investigations. If the audit probability is very low, the indirect
eﬀect is very high and the decrease in tax evasion induced by a rise in the audit rate is
quite substantial. But as the audit rate keeps on increasing the marginal reduction in tax
evasion gets smaller and smaller. This implies that as more resources become available
for investigations, they shouldn￿t be constantly focused on the group where initially the
marginal reduction in the payment gap was greater.
366C o n c l u s i o n
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ef o c u s e do nt h ee ﬀects of investigations on tax compliance. Recent
empirical studies have attempted to estimate the impact of audits on tax compliance by
measuring the elasticity of reported income and reported tax with respect to audits. Some
of these studies also provide estimates for the direct and indirect eﬀects of investigations.
Results however are not very easily compared and the methodology used to obtain the
estimates does not allow to distinguish the factors that determine the direct and indirect
eﬀects.
We decompose the elements of the direct and indirect eﬀects in quite a general model
and show that the ratio of the two depends on the behavioural elasticity, on how inten-
sively a given group of taxpayers is investigated and on the operational eﬀectiveness of
investigations. The intensity and the operational eﬀectiveness of investigations do indeed
vary across ￿scal areas and also across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers within the same ￿scal
area. Hence there is no reason to expect the ratio to be constant across diﬀerent groups
of taxpayers or diﬀerent ￿scalities. It then becomes important to estimate the diﬀerent
components of the ratio between the indirect and direct eﬀe c t st oh a v es o m ei n s i g h t so n
how the impact of audits diﬀer across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers. The estimation of
the elasticity of evasion is particularly problematic. The elasticity of evasion we de￿ne
is at the level of a group of taxpayers. One important question is whether we should
assume it to be constant across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers. But this question can only
be addressed empirically. We are however interested in understanding how the behav-
ioural response to an increase in the audit rate may diﬀer if considered at individual level
or at the level of a group of taxpayers. This is important for choosing the level of data
aggregation to calculate the elasticity of evasion. We investigate how diﬀerent assump-
tions on the motivations driving taxpayers￿ behaviour may aﬀect the elasticity of evasion.
In particular we compare a setting where taxpayers decide whether or not to be honest
with no regard for the behaviour of other taxpayers to a situation where the decision is
interdependent and tax compliance is a social norm.
Our results suggest that if tax compliance is a social norm in the relevant commu-
nity this has important implications on the impact of an increase in the coverage rate
on voluntary compliance. At the aggregate level of the community of taxpayers, we can
expect a higher response to a change in the allocation of audit resources than in the
absence of a social norm. Essentially, social norms introduce a multiplier eﬀect: gener-
ating greater compliance through a deterrent eﬀect causes even more people to become
compliant through the social norm. The magnitude of the impact of audits on aggregate
behaviour will therefore be higher the greater the importance attached to the social norm.
Hence, when tax compliance is a social norm, the mechanism of enforcement is richer and
37also more eﬀective. In fact, if the social norm is sustained by moral commitment to the
law and by the desire to conform with the behaviour of honest taxpayers, it is possible
to use informal sanctions as an additional tool to enforce compliance. These rely on the
inhibitory power of moral commitment to the law and of the threat of social disapproval.
But at the same time, as we show, formal sanctions are also more eﬀective.
The importance attached to the social norm is likely to vary across taxpayers, so
that we should expect a heterogeneous response to a rise in the probability of detection
by diﬀerent taxpayers. Also, how compelling the social norm argument is depends on
the type of non-compliance: for example, taxpayers have diﬀerent attitudes towards tax
evasion and tax avoidance. Kirchler et al. (2003), conduct a survey among 252 ￿scal
oﬃcers, business students, business lawyers and small bunisness owners and report that
taxpayers discriminate between tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax ￿ight (de￿ned as
the relocation of business only in order to save taxes), and they also perceive them as
unequally fair, with tax evasion being the least positively regarded. Tax evasion can also
be undertaken in diﬀerent forms: late ￿ling, false bene￿t claims, income underreports,
expenses overstatements, VAT evasion, frauds linked to organised crime, and taxpayers
may have diﬀerent attitudes and opinions concerning these types of non-compliance. For
example, Orviska and Hudson (2002) conduct a survey on moral attitudes to tax evasion
and ￿nd that attitudes are more hostile to the evasion involving bene￿ts and least hostile
to the one involving VAT.
We also show that it is not necessarily optimal to put more resources in the groups
where the social norm is more compelling. The optimal allocation will depend also on the
average evasion taking place in the diﬀerent groups. The greater the average evasion the
greater will be the direct eﬀect of investigations. And the greater the diﬀerence in the
direct eﬀect across diﬀerent groups of taxpayers the less important are the elasticities in
determining the optimal allocation of resources.
One issue that we recognise but do not develop here is how people form their percep-
tions about the probability of being investigated. As we mentioned above the individual
elasticity of evasion confounds two diﬀerent elasticities: the sensitivity to the perceived
frequency of inspections and the sensitivity of the perceived probability of inspection to
the actual frequency of inspection. Distinguishing the factors which determine these two
elasticity is very important to better understand how taxpayers are in￿uenced by audits.
In modelling the optimal allocation of resources among diﬀerent groups of taxpayers,
we assumed that in each group taxpayers are only aﬀected by the probability of being
investigated in their group. But there may be some spillover eﬀects: an increase in the
coverage rate in one group could be observed in another group and this could alter the
perception of being investigated also in this group and increase their voluntary compliance.
These are possible extensions of our analysis.
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407 Appendix
Allocating investigation resources: the targeting case.
I ns e c t i o n3w ea s s u m e dar a n d o ma u d i tw i t h i nas p e c i ￿cg r o u po ft a x p a y e r s .T h et a x
authority did not have any information of how evasion diﬀers across taxpayers within the
same group, so that was not able to distinguish marginal evasion from average evasion
withing the same group of taxpayers.
We now suppose that the tax authority has some information about taxpayers that
enables it to distinguish the expected amount of evasion that one type of taxpayer might
be involved in relative to another.
More precisely, assume that the actual amount of evasion, ejk,i nw h i c ht h ej - th tax-
payer in group k is involved given by:
ejk = φk(xj,p k)+ξk (33)
where xj is a vector of observable individual characteristics and ξkis a random variable
with zero mean. We assume that the tax authorities have a risk-pro￿ling model that
enables to observe for any given taxpayer the expected amount of evasion
ejk = φk(xj,p k) (34)
For simplicity, assume that the eﬀectiveness of investigations is independent of tax-
payer type and is given once again by the constant θk.
Since behaviour depends solely on the fraction of people investigated - and not their
identity - in order to minimise the tax gap the tax authority will obviously want to target
those taxpayers with highest expected evasion.
To understand the implications of this, for expositional simplicity, we assume that x
is a scalar and that the distribution of x in the k-th group is given by the density function
lk(x). We also assume that φ(x,p) is a strictly increasing function of x.
This implies that if a fraction pk of taxpayers in group k are investigated these will be
all taxpayers for whom x ≥ xk,w h e r exk is de￿ned by
∞ Z
xk
lk(x)dx = pk (35)





As before let Ek(pk)=
∞ R
0
φk(xj,p k)l(x)dx be the average amount of evasion in group









41be the average amount of evasion amongst the sub-group of group k who are targeted
for investigations. Obviously, Ek <E t
k.
Also let Em
k = φk(xk,p k) be the expected evasion of the marginal taxpayer who is
targeted for investigation. Obviously Em
k <E t
k.
Since tax authorities typically only investigate a very small fraction of taxpayers, we
would normally expect that Ek <E m
k ,a n ds oEk <E t
k.




Ek be the sensitivity of taxpayer behaviour to the probability








sensitivity of the sub-group of taxpayers who are targeted for investigation.











An alternative way of writing this is
Gk = Nk[Ek − θkpkE
t
k] (39)

































































which is the formula one would get from (39).
The formula in (43) is very similar to that in (5).
The question is what we can say from this about the ratio of the indirect to the direct
eﬀect of investigation activity. This depends on what one means by the direct and indirect
eﬀect - the average or marginal eﬀect of the tax authority activity.
42If we de￿ned the direct eﬀect as θkEt
k - i.e. the average y i e l df o r ma ni n v e s t i g a t i o n-















If the tax authority were unable to target investigation resources then we would have
Ek = Et
k; εk = εt
k and (44) would collapse to (8).
If the tax authority were able to target,but there were no reason to think that the
behavioural response of targeted taxpayers was signi￿cantly diﬀerent from non-targeted
taxpayers, then we would have Ek <E t
k; εk ≈ εt




















and so, as we might expect, targeting gives a lower ratio of the indirect to the direct eﬀect.
However this approach would be very odd since the direct doesn￿t re￿ect the fact that
the tax authority is targeting resources and so, if given extra resources, would deploy those
on the marginal taxpayer. So if we de￿ne the direct eﬀect as θkEm
k - i.e. the marginal



























If we compare (46) with (44) then we see that the expression on the RHS of (46) is
larger than the expression on RHS of (44) - which is not surprising since the MRPG is the
same and, in (46) we are using as denominator the marginal direct eﬀect which is smaller
than the average, which is denominator in (44). This shows up in two ways. First of all




k > 1 - which is a re-scaling eﬀect to re￿ect the diﬀerent








If the coverage rate is very low then we would expect the marginal and average values
to be very similar, so, the values we get in (44) and (46) are likely to be very similar.
Once again, if the tax authority were unable to target investigation resources then we
would have Ek = Et
k; εk = εt
k and (46) would collapse to (8).
If the tax authority were able to target, but there were no reason to think that the
behavioural response of targeted taxpayers was signi￿cantly diﬀerent from non-targeted
taxpayers, then we would have Ek <E m
k <E t
k; εk ≈ εt























What this suggests is that in many circumstances the ratio of the indirect eﬀect to the











43which is just a mild adjustment to the original formula in (8).
44